40. Trivia Trivia

1. GENERAL

We had already looked at the principle of legality in the Austrian Federal Constitution in the 39th instalment of ‘Wissens-Schnitzerl’. This principle of legality is derived from Article 18(1) of the Federal Constitutional Act (B-VG) („All public administration must be exercised solely in accordance with the law“) is derived from this and forms an essential part of the fundamental principle of the rule of law.

The fundamental principle of the rule of law requires that (i) all state action be subject to the law and (ii) any breach of this principle of legality may be challenged before state authorities. The Federal Constitutional Act (B-VG) fulfils both these requirements. Austria is therefore both a state governed by the rule of law and a state offering legal protection.

What this means in concrete terms can be gleaned from the case law of the Constitutional Court, which derives, amongst other things, requirements of specificity, comprehensibility and efficiency from the principle of legality. Regulations are therefore unconstitutional if, for example, they grant the administration too wide a scope for discretion („delegation by statutory provision“), are formulated in an incomprehensible manner („puzzle-like findings“: VfSlg 12.420) or against which no effective legal remedy is available (compulsory legal classification, duty to state reasons, minimum standard of factual effectiveness of legal protection).

 

2. PRINCIPLE OF SPECIFICITY

The Constitutional Court also concludes from the obligation to comply with the law that the legislature is obliged to, provisions that are sufficiently specific in terms of their content to be enacted: The law must therefore be formulated with sufficient precision to enable an enforcement measure (regulation, decision, exercise of direct administrative authority to issue orders and impose coercive measures, directive) to be reviewed against the law to determine its lawfulness. Whilst the use of vague legal terms or references is not generally prohibited, the need for precision varies depending on the subject matter; this may preclude the „frequent“ use of such merely determinable provisions. For example, the definition of administrative competences must be precise; likewise, provisions that typically interfere with fundamental rights („provisions involving significant interference“) and, in particular, criminal law provisions must contain precise definitions.

The principle of specificity touches on a fundamental problem of law: we live in a legal system in which the will of the legislator is regularly expressed in writing – for example, in federal or state gazettes. If, as a person subject to the law, one wishes to find out what one is required to comply with (i.e. what the content of that provision is), one must therefore read and understand the provision. For this interaction between the lawmaker and those subject to the law – which is absolutely essential in a constitutional state – two things are therefore required: a person subject to the law who can read in a way that allows them to grasp the meaning to some extent, and a lawmaker who can write in a way that makes the meaning reasonably clear.

The Constitutional Court correctly recognised this: In its – now famous – ruling VfSlg 12.420, it struck down an incomprehensible statutory provision on the grounds that „only with subtle expertise, extraordinary methodological skills and a certain inclination towards solving brainteasers … [it is] possible to understand at all what instructions are intended here“.

This „insight from the world of logic“ has since become the benchmark and the „stick in the window“ of legislative drafting: legislation that is imprecisely worded, and perhaps even incomprehensible, is not merely bad legislation; it may also be unconstitutional.

 

3. TO PUT IT INTO A NUTSHELL

The principle of legality enshrined in Article 18(1) of the Federal Constitutional Law (B-VG) also includes, amongst other things, a requirement for specificity: provisions that are not formulated in a comprehensible manner may be unconstitutional.

We recognise the value and necessity of clear, easily understandable regulations, and we’ll stand with you in the fight against the all-too-common „legal jargon“ and „obscure legalese“. Clarity is essential, particularly in the law. Join us and make a difference!

Written by:

Dr. Walter Schwartz
Attorney at law and founding partner

SHMP Schwartz Huber-Medek Partner Rechtsanwälte GmbH
Hohenstaufengasse 7
A-1010 Vienna

tel: +43.1.513 50 050
fax: +43.1.513 50 05-50
office@shmp.at